

10 The Presidency and the Media: Two Faces of Democracy

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The relationship between the presidency and the news media is at times cooperative and at other times adversarial. But it has always been symbiotic—because each draws on the same source of legitimacy. Presidents can only reach the American people through the media: newspapers, magazines, radio, network television, cable television, and, more recently, multiple forms of Web-based communication. The news media need the president to speak words and take actions that will provide interesting content to their audiences. As Elvin Lim shows, these constant elements in the presidency-media relationship have played out differently in different historical eras: the patrician era that lasted until about 1828, the partisan era that took its place until about 1900, the pluralist era that spanned the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, and the plebiscitary era in which we have lived since about 1970.

The relationship between the presidency and the media is more than just a functional one, with each institution trying at times to co-opt the other as partner, and, at other times, to outwit the other. Scores of articles and books have been written about the relationship between the presidency and the media, asking whether the affiliation is adversarial or complementary.¹ The relationship has fluctuated from mutual contempt at the time of the John Adams administration and the 1798 Sedition Act to mutual coexistence as the presidency became more plebiscitary over the years. The public can take sides. Sometimes, the media wins, as was the case when the media earned a newfound respect after Bob Woodward, Carl Bernstein, and others uncovered President Richard Nixon's involvement in the Watergate scandal. Other times, the president wins, such as when the media's feeding frenzy over President Bill Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky backfired, and Clinton's approval ratings soared.² There is a larger and more important story to tell though, beyond these ups and downs. The fluctuations reflect a linking of institutional fates, especially in the twentieth century, when the Framers' idea that all authority came from the Constitution was gradually sidelined by the idea that the American people are an alternate,

and even the highest source of legitimacy. The reason why the president needs the press and the press needs the presidency is that both are purveyors of the democratic faith and equally beholden to it. Both the presidency and the media have been the principal drivers and beneficiaries of this reevaluation of democratic sanction over constitutional authority. To understand the relationship between the modern presidency, which derives its authority from public support, and the media, we must understand their separate but analogous relationships with democracy, or, more precisely, the American people.

As bedfellows in a transfigured system, the presidency and the media are more friends than foes. Indeed, the rhetorical presidency is not a single person, but an institution, and the media is intricately implicated, if not embedded, in it.³ This is most evident in the personnel overlap between the presidency and the media in the person of the president's press secretary, as well as in the considerable White House infrastructure charged to deal with the media and the public: the Office of Communications, the Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs (formerly the Office of Public Liaison and Intergovernmental Affairs), and the speechwriting staff. All of these personnel help the president "go public," and it is a very foolhardy president who makes the mistake of thinking that the rhetorical presidency is a one-man army.⁴

The fluidity with which people move between the White House communications and public outreach staff and the media establishment reveals a shared understanding of, if not a commitment to, the journalistic codes of conduct and the *modus operandi* of modern, mediated politics. Because both the media and the presidency are reaching out to the same audience, they are bound by the same rules of mass communication. All things being equal, television audiences, and to a lesser extent, newspaper readers, are more focused on the short term than the long term, simple themes over complex arguments, and human interest stories over pure policy stories.⁵ The White House staff members who are tasked to engage in media and public outreach understand the arts of popular infotainment, just as the modern president must understand the "arts of popular leadership."⁶ And the arts of popular leadership are not so different from the arts of popular infotainment. Indeed, many White House staff members are recruited to serve precisely because they maintain personal and professional contact with members of the media outlets from whence they hailed and to which they typically return after their tour of duty.

Beyond the president's staff, there is a considerable swath of White House correspondents and other personnel from the media who, though they are not working for the president, nevertheless operate in the penumbra of the rhetorical presidency. Presidents who fail to incorporate this penumbra into their comprehensive public relationship strategy are likely to run into trouble. Such was the case with Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon, who were often too suspicious of the media to bring journalists into their confidence, with the

result that both limited their capacity to persuade the public. The rhetorical president needs positive coverage and feedback from journalists in order for his message to reach deep into the public consciousness. An example of this occurred in 1919, when Wilson, travelling to Paris to negotiate the Treaty of Versailles, refused to co-opt the correspondents travelling with him. Wilson failed to realize that the bully needs his pulpit. And it is the media that gives presidents the oversized podium on which they speak.

When Theodore Roosevelt or Lyndon Johnson invited journalists into the Oval Office, they were “going public,” even though they appeared to be in private conversation. Roosevelt and Johnson understood that the rhetorical presidency is about more than the president giving speeches, and that the media is engaged in a collective endeavor with the president to woo the public, or at least to increase ratings at the same time that they help to disseminate the president’s message. The success of Theodore Roosevelt’s rhetorical presidency may be attributed not only to the fact that he held back rhetorically when Congress was about to vote so he did not appear too heavy-handed, but also to his wise choice not to wage war on the very people who were part of the infrastructure of the bully pulpit.⁷

The Parallel Developmental Pathways of the Presidency and the Media

To argue that the rhetorical presidency is a collective institution is also to say that the American presidency and the media are two institutions that feed off, and, in turn, promote, plebiscitary democracy. At least since Woodrow Wilson, presidents have routinely articulated the idea that it is their duty, derived from their unique station as representative of the whole nation, to divine and interpret the needs of the people.⁸ Defenders of the free press have theorized similarly about the press’s relationship to the people. To the extent that self-government requires each citizen to be free to choose his or her own opinion, Alexis de Tocqueville argued, “The sovereignty of the people and the liberty of the press may therefore be regarded as correlative.”⁹

Certainly, the two institutions are often also in competition for the people’s attention. But unlike the president’s relationship with Congress, the presidency and the media do not have to play a constitutional zero-sum game. This is because the media does not appear in the Constitution, and therefore is not implicated in the separation of powers. Presidents and members of Congress all represent the people, and so it has been a perennial constitutional and political question as to who represents the people better. But the media does not have a dog in this fight. Although the media purports to be a protector of the people’s liberties, and in particular the people’s right to free speech, it cannot constitutionally be said to represent the people. Because the president’s and the media’s quests for public endorsement are somewhat orthogonal to each other, they are

more likely to co-exist in relative comity than the elected branches do. This may explain why the presidency and the media have developed in lockstep with democracy, each appropriating a different kind of legitimacy from the people in a non-zero-sum manner. The result is that each era in American political history—patrician, partisan, pluralist, and plebiscitary—has produced a parallel development in both the presidency and the media.¹⁰

The bond between the presidency and the press began in the Framers' suspicion of unbridled democracy and their fear of the arts of popular leadership. When they gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to design a new scheme of government, the Framers neither created nor envisioned an executive that would one day surpass Congress in public prestige or political influence. The *patricians* of the era warned against the “baneful effects of the Spirit of Party,” and they certainly did not envision a permanent campaign for president by way of a partisan press.¹¹ As the idea of presidents speaking directly to the people was frowned upon as a technique of demagoguery, so were political mores against the idea of an independently editorializing press, purporting to report in the interest of the people. Indeed, as indicated by the Sedition Act, which made it unlawful for any person to “write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States,” the Federalist opinion of the scope of free speech protected by the First Amendment was decidedly narrow.¹² Lest this view sound totally repugnant to modern ears, it should be said that even Tocqueville approved of the liberty of the press “from a consideration more of the evils it presents than of the advantages it ensures” because his celebration of democracy was equally qualified.¹³

All this was to change in the *partisan* era of American politics, the era from around 1828 to 1900 when the political party and the partisan press emerged as legitimate institutions in their own right. Both politically and financially, the fates of the party and the press were maximally intertwined in this era.¹⁴ The party was Martin Van Buren's solution to the need for democratic campaigning without direct presidential campaigning, and the press was a fundamental instrument that the democracy sponsored to this end. Van Buren, the architect of the Democratic Party, believed that regular party competition would be more effective in checking power than the Constitution's formal separation of powers.¹⁵ This was an audacious departure from the Framers' belief that the Newtonian system they had created was self-regulating. The press, which had no constitutional pedigree, had to make the same argument, and they have the presidency to thank for having first proposed it. The more presidents were willing to reach outside of the constitutional toolkit for actual power beyond formal powers, the more the press could take the White House's lead to clinch some of this power because it had no access to any powers.¹⁶ In effect, the presidency led the way for the press, who, as Tocqueville observed, began “in a

very humble position with a scanty education and a vulgar state of mind” to find its own legitimacy from the people.¹⁷ Journalists would soon parrot the Jacksonian refrain that corruption in high places can only be effectively checked and controlled from without. The linked fate between the presidency and the press would become increasingly evident in the synergistic benefits of an emerging mass electorate and readership. As the partisan presses flourished in the Jacksonian era, especially when the first penny presses (selling daily papers for one cent) emerged, so too did the first sustained displays of presidential assertiveness.¹⁸

The next phase of the parallel development of the presidency and the media began toward the end of the nineteenth century, when a Progressive presidency emerged alongside a Progressive press at the dawn of the *pluralist* era, which lasted from around 1900 to the 1970s. As the tide turned against “yellow journalism” and the partisan presses, an increasingly consolidated and professionalized “objective” press emerged in the Progressive Era to assert its monopoly on the truth. So too did the rhetorical presidency, wrenching power away from state and local bosses and politicians in the name of merit and expertise.¹⁹ This was also the era when America made its first serious foray into global politics, and when the presidency enjoyed a bump in prestige as commander in chief, the influence of the media that was reporting his wars increased as well. When citizens “rally round the flag,” both the president, as commander in chief, and the national media, as spokespersons both for the president and the people, stand to gain.²⁰ Perhaps this is why it remains debatable whether it was William McKinley or William Randolph Hearst who was more enthusiastic about the Spanish-American War.²¹ When Richard Neustadt observed that crisis had become routine for the Progressive presidency, he may have contributed to the self-fulfilling prophecy that presidents thrive under conditions of perceived crisis.²² So do the media.

The onset of muckraking during the Progressive Era indicated the coming of age of American media. No longer were journalists creatures of their political patrons. Now they were in a position to cry foul not only at corporate greed, but also at governmental corruption or incompetency. Even here though, the president and the media’s kinship remained evident in their shared source of legitimacy. As Progressive presidents and the professionalized civil service marginalized the party bosses by claiming to govern on behalf of the American people, so too the objective and professionalized media unseated the partisan media in the name of defending the public interest. “An able, disinterested, public-spirited press . . . can preserve that public virtue without which popular government is a sham and a mockery,” wrote publisher Joseph Pulitzer in the year he endowed the creation of the School of Journalism at Columbia. And because the journalist “holds the official to his duty,” he added, “the orator that reaches the American democracy is the newspaper.”²³ It was

independent access to democratic sanction that led the press out of the shadow of the presidency, but it was also a mutual recognition of their shared source of legitimacy that motivated presidents and journalists to vie for the title of the true defender of democracy. When Theodore Roosevelt took on the muckrakers for their allegedly destructive criticism—“the man who could look no way but downward”—he was also portraying himself as a constructive moralist and a pragmatic do-gooder—the true tribune for the people.²⁴ He was trying to reclaim the moral high ground from the journalists and assert first claim on the title of “avenger of public wrongs,” which some of the Framers of the Constitution had envisioned for the presidency.²⁵

The advent of new technologies in the twentieth century meant that presidents and journalists had to bend to new rationalities and imperatives. As radio ownership rose from 1 percent in 1922 to over 80 percent in 1940, and radio audiences became hungrier for instantaneous news, journalists scrambled to report it and presidents endeavored to make it.²⁶ Calvin Coolidge and other politicians who took to the new medium had to cool down their speech, and radio personalities had to cultivate a more homogenous, professional tone for their audiences than when they were writing for the yellow press. When television came, audiences became accustomed to visual news and cues, and journalists and presidents both had to devote attention to make-up and backdrops. And as presidents took on even more prominence compared with members of Congress, so too did journalists become celebrity pundits of the plebiscitary age, respected for their opinions in their own right. Indeed, the American political system of today would be unrecognizable if these actors from the White House and the media establishment receded from the public stage.

To be sure, the story of parallel development should not be taken too far. The public interacts differently with the media and the presidency. Both are out to woo audiences, but they understand the audiences differently. For the media, viewership and readership are ends in themselves because they generate advertising dollars and profit. Audiences are customers. For presidents, audiences are citizens, potential voters, and potential letter writers who might contact their members of Congress to do the president’s bidding. Not surprisingly, even though shared means of transmission brought a convergence of technique, the interest of the two institutions also began to diverge when technological innovations altered the balance of power between the presidency and the media. The idea of “news” had taken on modern meaning with the invention of the telegraph in the late 1830s, which made possible the near-instantaneous electromagnetic transmission of written messages over the entire continent by 1861.²⁷ Gradually, newsmakers began to rely on the news transmitters as much as the latter had once relied on the former for government contracts. As the news media emerged as legitimate service providers in

their own right, with access to advertising revenue, they began to bend their ears and business acumen toward their customers and became less tethered to parties and politicians.

Even so, the media has reason to avoid all-out, sustained wars with the presidency. The media wants access to and information from the president, and the president wants the media to cover the news he makes, and to cover it favorably. As far as news making goes, the White House has few competitors inside or outside the Washington Beltway, in part because the president enjoys the office's symbolic prestige, which no other politician in the United States can match. The news media, on the other hand, must compete with the entertainment-industrial complex, which is dedicated to the coverage of sports, music, celebrities, and so forth. It is not in the interest of the news media to wage all-out war with the president. The news media would only depreciate its credibility if it becomes perceived as a nit-picking, scandal-mongering institution. Credibility matters, because without it, the news media loses its product-differential quality and becomes just another entertainment genre, competing with a sea of alluring substitutes.

In the *plebiscitary* era that began in the 1970s, not only does the president lack clear bargaining partners in Congress who would be able to deliver on promises made on behalf of coalitions, he also lacks clear partners in the media.²⁸ Gone are the days when the three national television networks and the major newspapers commandeered the news of the day. Bargaining, either with Congress or the media, has become a less rewarding strategy than it used to be. This does not mean that going public is more rewarding than bargaining was at mid-century, but it does mean that bargaining is unlikely to be more rewarding than going public. There was a time when presidents were able to “monopolize the public sphere,” but this has become increasingly difficult in a fragmented media age.²⁹ Part of the explanation, to be sure, is the unraveling of the New Deal consensus that began around 1970. This consensus manifested itself both in the phenomenon of “pack journalism” and in the moderate conservatism of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon.³⁰ As the country became more politically polarized, media choices also expanded and fragmented, with the result that presidential politics have tended in the direction of perpetually preemptive politics—that is, the tendency to assert independence from old ways and received wisdom without necessarily producing any tangible outcomes.³¹

But the bond between the presidency and the media persists. Their relationship in our modern, polarized, plebiscitary democracy is in some ways a throwback to the partisan era, when news reporting and editorializing were practically the same thing. As Washington has become more polarized, so too has the media. But there is one notable difference. In the late eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries, publishers and journalists were mouthpieces for the parties. In the era before mass circulation, newspapers relied on government printing contracts for their viability, which is why the major publications of the era were penned by politicians in positions of power, using pseudonyms such as Publius, Pacificus, and Helvidius. Today, journalists are not tethered to parties, but they are often linked to politicians by partisanship, and the result is that they have lost some of the collective prestige they held in the post-Watergate period when they were more united in their commitment to objectivity as an ideal. Nevertheless, the bond between presidents and journalists of like ideological minds in the twenty-first century is at least as strong as when it was based on business and patronage in the nineteenth century, because it is grounded in a mutual allegiance to the segment of the public opinion with which they are in ideological sync.

Reflecting on the Two Faces

Critics of the rhetorical presidency understand that some of the dilemmas of modern governance arise from the existence of sources of power that presidents can appeal to from beyond the Constitution. Presidents stay within or reach outside of the Constitution's borders depending on their popularity; they are more likely to brandish their constitutional powers when they lack popular support for a particular political agenda. However, it is fair to say that the contemporary presidency is more often Jeffersonian than Hamiltonian, insofar as the presidency is much more routinely "public" than it is "imperial."³² This is arguably because public opinion is more pliable and elastic than the text of the Constitution, and there may be more power yet to be derived from the public than there are powers left to be gleaned from the Constitution. The media, of course, must always rely on the good graces of public opinion, as it has no other sources of legitimacy. Fortunately for both the presidency and the media, but less so for the Republic, democracy appears to be a gift that has kept giving to them.

Much that is flawed in American politics can be attributed to the perils of presidentialism and the antics of the media as each institution tries to outdo the other in courting the citizenry.³³ It is ironic that both purport to speak on behalf of the American people, yet often the information they purvey is merely mutually self-serving. For example, during the 2012 presidential election, the media sustained the narrative that the race was close even though, according to almost every poll, Barack Obama had more paths to 270 Electoral College votes at almost every stage of the campaign. The media had an interest in keeping things close, and the candidates needed the same narrative to ensure maximal turnout, so both colluded to keep audiences enraptured. To the extent that we

are dissatisfied with aspects of the modern presidency and the media, our dissatisfactions have something to do with the darker side of democracy.

When opinions and interpretations are so frequently incorporated or placed alongside news reporting, professional journalists no longer enjoy the credibility of those from a generation before. They can rile us, but they do not necessarily inform us. We live in a media era in which there are no longer significant reputational differences between Jon Stewart and Comedy Central and Wolf Blitzer and CNN, and the emergence of celebrity journalists of either the satirical or putatively professional kind indicates that the media's influence is less to influence public opinion directly than to set the agenda for the public sphere. The blurring of lines between news reporting and entertaining parallels the overlapping of governing and campaigning by the White House.³⁴ Neither presidents nor journalists today pay much heed to Alexander Hamilton's warning in *The Federalist* no. 71:

The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.

This is because democracy has penetrated both the presidency and the media; the evolving characteristics of both these institutions reveal a deeper transformation of a republic set up in many ways to prevent the excesses of direct democracy into one increasingly suspicious of indirect, representative government.

As billions of dollars are being spent on presidential campaigns—much of which are transfers from campaigns to television and cable networks—we should ask if the two faces of democracy are as charming as we are asked to believe. The death of objectivity or even the pretense of objectivity in the media parallels the demise of authenticity (or its pretense) in the White House.³⁵ It may be that audiences and citizens have become less susceptible to manipulation as they have lowered their expectations that either the media or the president will be objective or truthful. But these lowered expectations also encourage audiences and citizens to dig in on both their particular truths and private pursuits—a condition that presidents who go “local” or “narrow” can easily exploit.³⁶ When those who have the wherewithal to influence the state of the public sphere do so only to benefit their own private agendas, the public sphere cannot thrive. With so much wrangling, accusation, and fulmination in American politics, it is difficult for citizens to feel much comfort with our raucous democracy.³⁷ A thousand fragmented fora on as many radio and television channels and Web sites do not a public sphere make. It also makes presidential popular leadership a confounding task.

Today, segmented media markets perpetuate self-reinforcing “echo chambers,” causing even the most seductive presidential speeches to often fall “on deaf ears.”³⁸ If presidential leadership, in order to be successful, must navigate around this boundary condition, a successful journalistic career must embrace it as a given fact of public opinion. To be a leader, the president must adopt a wholly national perspective and articulate a coherent account of the cacophony of voices he represents; to be popular, he needs only to give in to enough of these voices to constitute an electoral majority. Presidential leadership, consequently, occurs much less frequently in the plebiscitary age because it is easier to deploy the arts of popular leadership than it is to govern.

Tocqueville was among the first students of American politics to observe the curious paradox that both an abundance of freedom and the yoke of social conformism exist in the United States. Tocqueville, and later Louis Hartz, attributed the latter to a cultural aversion to speculative reflection, itself a result of the condition of a people having been born into a state of freedom without having had to fight for it.³⁹ According to Tocqueville, Americans “cling to their opinions as much from pride as from conviction. They cherish them . . . because they chose them of their own free will; and they adhere to them, not only because they are true, but because they are their own.”⁴⁰ The cumulative result is that “human opinions were reduced to a sort of intellectual dust, scattered on every side, unable to collect, unable to cohere.”⁴¹ To paraphrase *The Federalist* no. 71, today it is not the deliberate sense of the community that drives the governing and public agenda, but the transient impulses of the people, stoked by those familiar with the arts of public management.

Conclusion

If the basis of the president’s authority is in Article II of the Constitution, the formal source of the media’s legitimacy is, albeit indirectly, in the First Amendment. Yet both institutions have preferred to draw the lion’s share of their energy extraconstitutionally—from the people. It is democracy, and the president’s access to the people, that have caused Article II to take precedence over Article I, just as it is democracy, and the media’s access to mass audiences, which have made the media establishment an institution equal to the bully pulpit. In the era before the rhetorical presidency, presidents had to choose between popularity and extraconstitutionality, or reticence and dignity, because going public had not yet been routinized. In the era of yellow journalism and before, news outlets had to choose between high circulation and sensationalism or lower circulation and professionalism because the media still had not come into its own. The presidency and the press are today beyond the dilemmas they faced in the nineteenth century. Because they function, ostensibly, as the arms

of democracy, they command the pulse of American politics more than other institutions, such as the Supreme Court, which do not have as ready access to the people.

A completely unregulated press is like an untamed executive mining freely from the well of democratic sanction. But there is little incentive for either institution to call the kettle black, which may explain why the fourth estate has a closer relationship to the second branch than their occasional public jostling might indicate. More often than not, a truce prevails between the two institutions because the media thrives in a presidential democracy. It gravitates toward the president because he is a symbolically potent figurehead of American democracy; everything that emanates from the White House is at once news and a human interest story because it involves the most conspicuous protagonist of American politics.⁴²

Presidents are not likely to challenge this bias. Every four years, candidates, regardless of their view of government, line up to say that the president is the solution to our problems. For their part, presidents gravitate toward the media because journalists are a conduit to the pulse of the people, and knowledge of and influence over public opinion is the greatest supplement a president can have beyond his constitutional authority in this plebiscitary age. To focus on the jostling and competition between the media and the president for the people's love and attention, then, may be to lose sight of the larger picture that the developmental paths of these institutions evidence. That the presidency, which once hid behind powdered wigs and patrician mores of public reticence and restraint, has burst so unreservedly into the public stage, and that the media, a derided profession once reserved for the humble, has become one of the quickest routes to political influence and celebrity stature indicate that these institutions have a cozier relationship with each other than they care to admit. The presidency and the media share an umbilical cord that is connected to the same people they purport to represent or protect, and that is why they have traversed analogous developmental paths and reached similar ends.

The presidency had a serious hand in elevating the status of journalists, and the media has played a tremendous role in helping the president become *primus inter pares* among the three branches. As the presidency has evolved to include informal resources of power beyond the formal text of the Constitution, the media has become more formally institutionalized in terms of its commercialization and professionalization. What links both these developments is that although the Framers of the Constitution were wary of democracy and buffered what they deemed to be its ill effects by way of the separation of powers, presidents and journalists have jointly reversed this major premise of 1787. The presidency and the media have become two institutional titans in American politics because the constitutional republic has evolved into a plebiscitary democracy.

Notes

1. Matthew A. Baum, "Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (2005): 213–234; Martha J. Kumar, "The White House and the Press: News Organizations as a Presidential Resource and as a Source of Pressure," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (2003): 669–683; Kathleen H. Jamieson and Paul Waldman, *The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories that Shape the Political World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Larry J. Sabato, *Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1991).
2. Frank Newport, "Presidential Job Approval: Bill Clinton's High Ratings in the Midst of Crisis, 1998," June 4, 1999, Gallup, www.gallup.com/poll/4609/presidential-job-approval-bill-clintons-high-ratings-midst.aspx.
3. Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). On Wilson's treatment of the correspondents in Paris, see Stephen Ponder, *Managing the Press: Origins of the Media Presidency, 1897–1933* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 105–106.
4. Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997).
5. Elvin T. Lim, *The Anti-Intellectual Presidency: The Decline of Presidential Rhetoric from George Washington to George W. Bush* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
6. James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 12.
7. On Roosevelt's strategic and well-timed reticence, see Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 106.
8. Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908).
9. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 1, 183.
10. For the four "emergent structures" of secular time, see Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1997), 30, 52–55.
11. George Washington, "Farewell Address, September 19, 1796," in *The Writings of George Washington*, ed. Jared Sparks (Boston: American Stationers' Company, 1836), 12, 224. See also Ralph Ketcham, *Presidents above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789–1829* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987). On the permanent campaign, see Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, eds., *The Permanent Campaign and its Future* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, 2000).
12. See Paul Finkelman, ed., *Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1, 38.
13. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1, 181.
14. Each administration of the early Republic enlisted the service of an official paper, whether it was the *Gazette* for Washington's administrations, the *National Intelligencer* for Jefferson's, or the *Globe* for Jackson's. At least until the establishment of the Government Printing Office in 1860, official papers enjoyed security in federal contracts and subsidies, and many editors were also beneficiaries of executive patronage. See Richard M. Perloff, *Political Communication* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998), 22; Mel Laracey, *Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003).

15. Martin Van Buren, *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 125.
16. For the “power” and “powers” distinction, see Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 31.
17. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1, 187. See also Darrell M. West, *The Rise and Fall of the Media Establishment* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), 20.
18. James M. Lee, *History of American Journalism* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 186.
19. “Yellow journalism” was so termed after a popular comic strip featuring the “Yellow Kid.” *New York Press* editor Ervin Wardman used the term to describe the sensationalistic, anything-goes style of reporting of the late 1890s that was dedicated to entertainment and increasing circulation rather than the transmission of accurate information. See Joseph W. Campbell, *Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 30.
20. For the “rally” effect, see John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985).
21. Allan Keller, *The Spanish-American War: A Compact History* (New York: Hawthorn, 1969); Campbell, *Yellow Journalism*; Robert P. Saldin, “William McKinley and the Rhetorical Presidency,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (2011): 119–134.
22. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, 5.
23. Joseph Pulitzer, “The College of Journalism,” *The North American Review* 178 (1904): 680.
24. Theodore Roosevelt, “The Man with the Muck-rake,” in *Roosevelt's Writings: Selections from the Writings of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Maurice G. Fulton (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 177.
25. “A (Maryland) Farmer I, February 15, 1788,” in *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, 7 vols, ed. Herbert J. Storing and Murray Dry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), vol. 5, 21.
26. West, *The Rise and Fall of the Media*, 131.
27. Wilma P. Hays, *Samuel Morse and the Telegraph* (New York: F. Watts, 1960).
28. Kernell, *Going Public*, 29.
29. Bruce Miroff, “Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics,” in *Rethinking the Presidency*, ed. Thomas Cronin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 219–232.
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